'Spirit, soul, and religion' are terms that are beginning to appear in the language of business. This development in language is part of a larger and worldwide trend which some have called 'a spirituality movement in the corporation' and others have labelled 'an internal revolution' among business people. The purpose of this paper is to explore these developments and to examine their implications for the advancement of the field of business ethics. The paper discusses the spirituality movement in business and (...) defines several key terms. Evidence is provided to document the reality of the movement. Finally, the academic field of business ethics is examined in the light of these recent trends. A plea is made for focusing on questions of spirit and religion in the development of the field of business ethics. (shrink)

1 Introducing Monsieur Foucault Stephen J. Ball Michel Foucault is an enigma, a massively influential intellectual who steadfastly refused to align himself ...

Are predictions about how one will freely and intentionally behave in the future ever relevant to how one ought to behave? There is good reason to think they are. As imperfect agents, we have responsibilities of self-management, which seem to require that we take account of the predictable ways we're liable to go wrong. I defend this conclusion against certain objections to the effect that incorporating predictions concerning one's voluntary conduct into one's practical reasoning amounts to evading responsibility for that (...) conduct. There is, however, some truth to this sort of objection. To understand the legitimate role of self-prediction in practical reasoning, we need to distinguish instances of coping responsibly with an anticipated failure to behave as one ought, on the one hand, from mere acquiescence in one's flaws, on the other. I argue that, to draw this distinction, we must recognize certain limits on the use of self-prediction as a ground of choice. (shrink)

This chapter explores the future of global media ethics by focusing on a question that is a cause of misunderstanding and, perhaps, its greatest conceptual challenge: What is the goal of global media ethics? The chapter argues that the image of global media ethics has been distorted by the view that a global ethic must consist of one, uniquely correct set of principles affirmed by a large majority of journalists around the world. Instead, the chapter proposes the idea of global (...) media ethics as plural in structure and method, as different discourses across different cultures. The future of global media ethics is participation in webs of de-centered discourse about the changing world of global media. (shrink)

This essay responds to Hirstein, Sifferd and Fagan’s book, Responsible Brains, which claims that executive function is the guiding mechanism that supports both responsible agency and the necessity for some excuses. In contrast, I suggest that executive function is not the universal acid and the neuroscience at present contributes almost nothing to the necessary psychological level of explanation and analysis. To the extent neuroscience can be useful, it is virtually entirely dependent on well-validated psychology to correlate with the neuroscientific variables (...) under investigation. The essay considers what executive function is and what the neuroscience adds to our understanding of it. Then it addresses moral and legal responsibility generally, and specific doctrines. Executive function is seldom found to be the most perspicuous approach to any of the general or specific moral and legal questions. (shrink)

Most studies into the performance of socially responsible investment vehicles have focused on the performance of sustainable or socially responsible mutual funds. This research has been complemented recently by a number of studies that have examined the performance of sustainable investment indices. In both cases, the majority of studies have concluded that the returns of socially responsible investment vehicles have either underperformed, or failed to outperform, comparable market indices. Although the impact of sustainable indices to date has been limited, the (...) recent launch of sustainable indices by Dow Jones and FTSE suggests that more attention is being paid to the subject by financial markets, investors, and companies. This development raises a number of important issues which are reviewed in this article: (a) the performance of indices compared with their benchmark indices; (b) the methodologies employed in compiling the indices; and (c) the impact of the indices on companies and the investment community. The article concludes with a number of suggestions for areas that merit future research. (shrink)

This book develops an alternative approach to sentence- and word-meaning, which I dub the speech-act theoretic approach, or STA. Instead of employing the syntactic and semantic forms of modern logic–principally, quantification theory–to construct semantic theories, STA employs speech-act structures. The structures it employs are those postulated by a novel theory of speech-acts. STA develops a compositional semantics in which surface grammar is integrated with semantic interpretation in a way not allowed by standard quantification-based theories. It provides a pragmatic theory of (...) truth, a treatment of logically complex discourse as expressive cognitive states, and a background metaphysics in which the world is a totality of logically simple states of affairs. The book also puts forward an account of how intentional states provide the simple, representational foundation for a superstructure of speech-act structures–a system of thoughts–that far outruns the expressive power of the intentional foundation. In short, it provides an account of cognitive foundations of a language and a naturalistic reduction of semantics through an expressive theory of semantic norms. (shrink)

War metaphors are ubiquitous in discussions of everything from political campaigns to battles with cancer to wars against crime, drugs, poverty, and even salad. Why are warfare metaphors so common, and what are the potential benefits and costs to using them to frame important social and political issues? We address these questions in a detailed case study by reviewing the empirical literature on the subject and by advancing our own theoretical account of the structure and function of war metaphors in (...) public discourse. We argue that war metaphors are omnipresent because they draw on basic and widely shared schematic knowledge that efficiently structures our ability to reason and communicate about many different types of situations, and they reliably express an urgent, negatively valenced emotional tone that captures attention and motivates action. Nevertheless, we find that the meaning of war metaphors is intimately tied to the context in which they are used, which may result in either positive or negative outcomes, depending on the situation. Thus, blanket statements about whether or not a war frame is useful are misguided or overly constraining. Here we situate our case study results in relation to popular theories of metaphoric representation and processing and offer some guidelines for using a war framing effectively. This work helps illuminate the complex, dynamic, and nuanced functions of metaphor in cognition in general, and in public discourse in particular. (shrink)

This chapter provide an introductory portrait of global media ethics as an evolving discipline in broad strokes—its motivating questions, its distinct concerns and methods, how the discipline is related to other forms of ethics, and why we need a global media ethics. Since our global world is linked by many forms of media, the chapter argues that we need an accompanying global media ethics that challenges the use of media to promote racism, xenophobia, extreme nationalism, and the denial of human (...) rights. The chapter explores the types of research and writing that comprise global media ethics and concludes with an outline of how a global media ethics can be realized in practice. (shrink)

Consciousness is dimensionally structured. Nobody 'has' consciousness. Instead, everybody is 'in' consciousness. Building on the work of Samuel Avery, the book presents a new myth and paradigm for understanding consciousness, exploring the connections between consciousness, physics, quantum mechanics, myth, and meditation.Author Stephen Hage says, 'My intent is to provide a template readers can use to more clearly understand how the universe works and why, even though matter appears to truly exist, its existence cannot be scientifically proven. It explores enigmas (...) in physics which still exist and cannot be satisfactorily explained. It explains why the Dimensional Structure of Consciousness is a new paradigm upon which a new myth can be constructed to help better understand how the universe works as Copernicus did when he shattered the myth that the sun orbits the earth rather than the other way around.The style is conversational and friendly; the book is intended to be valuable for intelligent lay readers interested in the subjects of consciousness, physics, quantum mechanics, philosophy, metaphysics, myth and meditation; and the deep and meaningful connections between those areas of inquiry. (shrink)

Many people today believe that scientific and religious approaches to morality are mutually incompatible. Militant secularists claim scientific backing for their claim that the evolution of morality discredits religious conceptions of ethics. Some of their opponents respond with unhelpful apologetics based on fundamentalist views of revelation. This article attempts to provide an alternative option. It argues that public discussion has been excessively influenced by polemics generated by the new atheists. Religious writers have too often resorted to overly simplistic arguments rooted (...) in literalist approaches to the Bible and the religious traditions. More historically conscious methods can avoid implausible claims about both religion and science. (shrink)

We report an empirical study of elementary algebra errors, conducted in three separate schools. The errors are diagnosed using mal‐rules, as proposed by Sleeman (1984, 1,985). Our analysis uncovers the following properties of algebra mal‐rules: The frequency of mal‐rules is severely skewed, there are many infrequent mal‐rules and few frequent ones; mal‐rules are very unstable, students typically use mal‐rules very irregularly; different mal‐rules have explanatory power in different schools (many of our most powerful mal‐rules are previously unreported); mal‐rule diagnosis Is (...) more successful with more skilled students; students' confidence ratings do not partition the total set of mal‐rules, every mal‐rule we find is associated with high confidence ratings by at least one student. The Implications of our data for cognitive theories of error generation are discussed. Contrary to commonplace assumptions, we argue that It is impossible to make a clear distinction between slips and mistakes; most errors depend on properties of the knowledge base and the cognitive architecture. Errors In a procedural skill cannot be assumed to be purely syntactic In orgin. (shrink)

Recognizing that students are fundamentally engaged in a process of learning and self-development, ethical review of sub-doctoral student research should be proportionate to that objective. A student's tutor has the pedagogical role and an ethics committee should not interfere with that relationship other than to seek to avoid harms unforeseen by either the student or tutor. Underpowered or other statistically or methodologically flawed sub-doctoral research should not however, in general, be regarded as ethically concerning. With the proviso that no subject (...) is harmed the student can be allowed to learn such lessons as their mistakes may afford them. (shrink)

This chapter examines one class of public emotions – the “political emotions,” such as patriotism and promotion of the national interest and how they are, or are not, compatible with good journalism in a global media era. To what extent is journalism ethics, as we have known it, compatible with patriotism and love of nation? Can nation-based political emotions provide appropriate primary values for a global ethics and an emerging global media ethics? With regard to the first question, the chapter (...) argues that only a moderate patriotism is compatible with the principles of journalism ethics in a democracy. With regard to the second question, the chapter argues that a global ethics should not be based on nation-based values. It should be based on global emotions, or global political emotions. (shrink)

The current system of ethical oversight in the United States is based on Institutional Review Board (IRB) review. The system was established in response to well-known and egregious mistreatment of subjects in both biomedical and social and behavioral research. In the decades since the research regulations were enacted, reaction to the burden of IRB oversight has led the system to focus on compliance and limit its active oversight disproportionately to studies that could present the risk of physical harm. At the (...) same time, the characteristics of the research enterprise have changed and methodologies now present novel risks that were not envisioned in the regulations. We convened a group of IRB professionals, academic leaders, and others to discuss limitations of the current system, how that system could be changed to recognize evolving risks and an increasing focus on participant and community voice, and how it could better serve the needs of researchers and support the societal project of science as a public good. Recommendations included a call to reexamine the academic incentive structure, to develop a system to support consideration of ethical principles from the time of study design, and to explicitly provide different ethical support and oversight for high-risk interventional trials and lower risk biomedical and social behavioral research. (shrink)

Taking a distributed view of language, this paper naturalizes symbol grounding. Learning to talk is traced to — not categorizing speech sounds — but events that shape the rise of human-style autonomy. On the extended symbol hypothesis, this happens as babies integrate micro-activity with slow and deliberate adult action. As they discover social norms, intrinsic motive formation enables them to reshape co-action. Because infants link affect to contingencies, dyads develop norm-referenced routines. Over time, infant doings become analysis amenable. The caregiver (...) of a nine-month-old may, for example, prompt the baby to fetch objects. Once she concludes that the baby uses ‘words’ to understand what she says, the infant can use this belief in orienting to more abstract contingencies. New cognitive powers will develop as the baby learns to act in ways that are consistent with a caregiver’s false belief that her baby uses ‘words.’. (shrink)

How, if at all, does one's intention to realize an end bear on the justification for taking the means to that end? Theories that allow that intending an end directly provides a reason to take the means are subject to a well-known "bootstrapping" objection. On the other hand, "anti-psychologistic" accounts—which seek to derive instrumental reasons directly from the reasons that support adopting the end itself—have unacceptable implications where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible options. An alternative, predictive, role for intention (...) in means-end reasoning is considered and rejected. A new proposal is then developed, according to which instrumental reasons are not merely reasons to perform an act necessary for a given end, but to perform the act for the sake of that end. (shrink)

The question “What is philosophy?” is difficult to answer because it seems to presuppose answers to long‐standing and controversial philosophical questions. As answers to these questions affect one’s metaphilosophy, apparently irresolvable philosophical disagreements are then converted into deadlock concerning the nature of the discipline. As this problem is unique to philosophy, however, this difficulty itself reveals something of philosophy’s essential nature. As, under analysis, it turns out to arise from a definite way of posing problems, philosophy can initially be defined (...) by a particular mode of problematisation. This essay establishes this argument and proposes a method for developing this insight into a fully realised, socio‐historical metaphilosophy. This involves stages of (a) hermeneutical analysis and (b) historical contextualisation, both of which increase the account’s empirical adequacy. A conclusion discusses the extent to which philosophy is on trial here and argues that questioning the future of philosophy is not inherently philistine. (shrink)

This article provides an international perspective on how new media technologies are shifting the parameters of debates about journalism ethics. It argues that new, mixed media help create an ?open media ethics? and offers an exploration of how these developments encourage a transition from a closed professional ethics to an ethics that is the concern of all citizens. The relation between an open media ethics and the idea of a global fifth estate, facilitated by global online media, is explored. The (...) article concludes by providing suggestions for key normative conditions that could guide media ethics in this new media world. (shrink)

Expression patterns of Antennapedia‐like homeogenes in the mouse embryo show many similarities to those of their homologues in Drosophila. It is argued here that homeogenes may regulate development of the body plan in mouse by mechanisms similar to those used in Drosophila. In particular, they may differentially specify positional address of cell groups within lineage compartments along the body axes. In vertebrates, a single ancestral homeogene cluster has become duplicated to give four separate clusters. Comparisons of homeogene expression patterns between (...) different clusters of the mouse suggest ways in which duplication has permitted development of a more complex body plan. Cluster duplication may therefore have provided a selective advantage during vertebrate evolution. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh of the world’ speaks to an embodied connection to the spaces we inhabit deeply, primally, elementally. Flesh suggests water and its circulations, air and its respirations, earth and its conformations, fire and its inspirations. Flesh speaks to our bodily relations with the elements of a more-than-human world. This paper explores the felt imperative to these relations where, as Merleau-Ponty put it, ‘all distance is traversed’ and wherein movement arises not specifically in the body, but in the nexus (...) and intertwining of bodily engagement with the world. There is a primacy to movement that registers in the living body in its carnal ties to the elements of the world’s flesh. The ‘radical reflection’ on the ‘flesh of the world’ to which this analysis aspires in turn bears upon the general field of gestural reciprocities and connections, providing the insight that intimate gestures of the flesh, such as the embrace, are primordial attunements, motions of rhythm and reciprocity, that emanate from the world in identification with it. The embrace is fundamentally, elementally, a gesture of landscape dwelling. A phenomenology of elemental motions provides the textual reminder that to be at home in various landscapes means to know what it is to be embraced corporeally, sensually, within the human and especially the more-than-human folds of the world. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 6, Edition 1 May 2006. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the potential contributions of neuroscience to criminal justice decision-making and policy, with special emphasis on criminal responsibility. The central question is whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal justice. The general conclusion is that it is scarcely useful at present but may become more relevant as the science progresses. After explaining the meaning of criminal responsibility in use, the chapter speculates about the source of claims for the positive influence of neuroscience. The scientific status of behavioral neuroscience and (...) two radical challenges to responsibility neuroscience allegedly raises, determinism and the death of agency, are discussed next. Then, the specific relevance of neuroscience to criminal law and the use of neuroscience in criminal cases in the United States and abroad are addressed. The penultimate section points to some areas warranting modest optimism for the use of neuroscience in criminal justice. A brief conclusion follows. (shrink)

Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA. CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. What the authors see as an (...) intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves be about. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the potential contributions of neuroscience to legal policy in general and criminal justice in particular. The central question is whether neuroscience is relevant to legal policy. The chapter begins with speculation about the source of claims for the positive influence of neuroscience. It then turns to the scientific status of behavioral neuroscience. The next section considers the two radical challenges to current policies that neuroscience allegedly poses: determinism and the death of agency. The penultimate section addresses the (...) question of the specific relevance of neuroscience to legal doctrine, practice, and institutions. The final section points to some areas warranting modest optimism. The general conclusion, however, is that neuroscience is scarcely useful at present but may become more relevant as the science progresses. (shrink)

We argue that Henrich et al. do not go far enough in their critique: Sample diversification, while important, will not lead to the detection of generalizable principles. For that it will be necessary to broaden the range of contexts in which data are gathered. We demonstrate the power of contexts to alter results even in the presence of sample diversification.

This chapter defends the project of global media ethics against the skeptics. The overall question for this chapter can be stated as follows: Is the creation of global media ethics as a whole a realistic and desirable goal? The chapter proceeds by exploring, and responding to, the major criticisms of the project and its idea of moral globalism. It then presents a realistic conception of what can be achieved by global media ethics. The chapter concludes that it is both rational (...) and practically worthwhile to support the project of global media ethics. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to improve our conception of objectivity in general, especially in journalism and other media work. It defends the twin theses that: Global news media needs a new conception of objectivity and the conception of pragmatic objectivity is a viable candidate, and pragmatic objectivity is part of a radical rethinking of journalism and media ethics. It is an alternative to the professional objective model, a still-influential traditional idea of the objective journalist as a neutral stenographer of fact. Journalists (...) need to disrupt this model of good journalism. The chapter reconstructs objectivity as a natural evaluative capacity of humans that is situated and holistic. Then, it uses this naturalistic perspective to articulate pragmatic objectivity and apply it to journalism. (shrink)